Study · November 2026
Email security of German domains 2026
Only 39.9% of the most visited German domains with a mail server are effectively protected against forged senders.
On 18 November 2026 we checked the 10,000 most visited .de domains of the Tranco list: whether they set SPF and DMARC correctly, whether their DNS is signed and whether they use newer standards such as MTA-STS and BIMI. 8,974 of them accept email; shares refer to these unless stated otherwise.
The results at a glance
39.9%
fully protected against spoofing
A valid SPF record and DMARC with a quarantine or reject policy. Only then do receivers reject forged mail in the domain’s name.
23.9%
without DMARC
Another 34.3% only set DMARC to p=none: they observe, but do not protect.
91.8%
with exactly one SPF record
8.0% have none at all, 18 domains have two or more, which makes SPF invalid.
7.6%
with valid DNSSEC
Signed and confirmed by a validating resolver. We found no domain with a broken signature chain.
2.0%
enforce MTA-STS
Encrypted delivery as a requirement; 4.0% receive TLS-RPT reports about delivery problems.
4.5%
with a BIMI record
2.0% with a mark certificate (VMC), which makes the logo visible in Gmail and Apple Mail.
SPF
| Result | Domains | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Exactly one record, ending in -all (hard) | 4,426 | 49.3 % |
| Exactly one record, ending in ~all (soft) | 3,359 | 37.4 % |
| Exactly one record, ending in ?all (neutral) | 233 | 2.6 % |
| Exactly one record, delegating via redirect= | 187 | 2.1 % |
| Exactly one record without an all mechanism | 29 | 0.3 % |
| Two or more records (invalid) | 18 | 0.2 % |
| No SPF record | 722 | 8.0 % |
DMARC
| Policy | Domains | Share |
|---|---|---|
| p=reject | 1,873 | 20.9 % |
| p=quarantine (deliver as spam) | 1,861 | 20.7 % |
| p=none (observe only) | 3,078 | 34.3 % |
| Several or invalid records | 13 | 0.1 % |
| No DMARC record | 2,149 | 23.9 % |
53.0% receive aggregate reports (rua=). 140 domains apply quarantine or reject to only part of their mail (pct below 100).
Other standards
| Feature | Domains | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Valid DNSSEC | 685 | 7.6 % |
| MTA-STS in enforce mode | 183 | 2.0 % |
| MTA-STS in testing mode | 88 | 1.0 % |
| MTA-STS record without a valid policy | 49 | 0.5 % |
| TLS-RPT | 360 | 4.0 % |
| BIMI | 407 | 4.5 % |
| BIMI with a mark certificate (VMC) | 177 | 2.0 % |
| CAA (permitted certificate authorities) | 1,099 | 12.2 % |
The first 1,000 compared with all 10,000
| Feature | Top 1,000 | Share |
|---|---|---|
| DMARC with quarantine or reject | 461 | 50.4 % |
| DMARC at all (including p=none) | 787 | 86.1 % |
| Valid DNSSEC | 130 | 14.2 % |
| MTA-STS in enforce mode | 36 | 3.9 % |
| BIMI | 83 | 9.1 % |
For comparison across all 8,974 domains with a mail server: DMARC with quarantine or reject 41.6%, DMARC at all 75.9%, DNSSEC 7.6%.
What this means for client domains
Six in ten domains can still be forged as a sender. The biggest obstacle is not a lack of SPF (91.8% have one) but the final step: moving DMARC from p=none to quarantine or reject. 3,078 domains sit at p=none.
The step can be planned: aggregate reports (rua) show which services send in the domain’s name. Once all of them are covered by SPF and DKIM, the policy can be tightened in stages. The risk comes later, when someone adds a new sending service without updating SPF; that is exactly the kind of change monitoring should report.
Domains without email need protection too: of 882 domains without a mail server, only 144 declare via SPF "-all" that they never send mail, and only 119 set DMARC to reject.
Method
The basis is the Tranco list Tranco V38GN of 17 November 2026, a ranking of the most visited domains commonly used in research. We took the first 10,000 domains ending in .de; 9,856 of them resolve and 8,974 have a mail server (MX).
On 18 November 2026 we queried only public DNS via DNS over HTTPS (Cloudflare, falling back to Google) with DNSSEC validation, plus, for domains with an MTA-STS record, the public policy file at mta-sts.<domain>. No email was sent and no server was contacted beyond its public services.
Full protection means exactly one SPF record ending in -all or ~all or delegating via redirect=, and exactly one DMARC record with p=quarantine or p=reject. DNSSEC counts as valid when a DS record exists and the resolver confirms the answer with the AD flag set.
Limitations
- A snapshot of a single day; records change all the time.
- DKIM is not covered: without the selector, which only a sent message reveals, the key cannot be found reliably.
- Subdomains that send mail are not checked individually; DMARC applies to them through the main domain or sp=.
- If the MTA-STS policy is unreachable or broken, the domain counts as "without a valid policy", even if the problem was temporary.
- We publish counts per category only, never results for individual domains.
How does your domain do?
Check SPF, DMARC, DNSSEC, MTA-STS and BIMI for free without an account. DomainWarn then monitors the records continuously and reports every change.
Cite
DomainWarn: Email security of German domains 2026. Measurement of 18 November 2026 across the 10,000 most visited .de domains (Tranco V38GN). https://domainwarn.com/research/email-security-germany-2026